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The issue of visa-free travel has become a highly-debat-
ed issue within EU foreign policy. As the momentum 
for enlargement diminshes, the EU has started offering 
visa liberalisation as an incentive to influence reforms 
in countries across the EU’s neighbourhood. There ap-
pears to be significant potential in this approach: polls 
show that visa liberalisation is one of the tangible 
benefits non-EU citizens aspire to reap from the Un-
ion. The EU has recently offered a raft of agreements 
on visa liberalisation. It has attached conditionality to 
these agreements by requiring far-reaching reforms in 
the justice and home affairs area of signatory countries. 
However, are these agreements working as a influential 
foreign policy and integration tools?
The flip side to visa liberalisation is readmission agree-
ments which act as a tool to tackle irregular migration 
originating or transiting from third countries. These 
mostly work to the disadvantage of third countries. 
Thus, in order to convince the relevant country to sign 
such agreements and assume the cost and burden of 
readmission, the EU has to offer quid pro quo benefits. 
Visa facilitation is the ‘carrot’ offered in return for signing 
the readmission agreement.
Hence, Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreements 
are supposed to be a major driving force for reforms in 
candidate and potential candidate countries. Visa liber-
alisation is designed to act as a key means of leverage in 
the hands of the European Commission. But, how does 
this mechanism of reform promotion work in practice?
The experience of the Western Balkans and Turkey re-
veals mixed results. In the Balkans, the prospect of vi-
sa-free travel prompted the signature of readmission 
agreements as well as the implementation of compre-
hensive reforms. But in Turkey the lack of clear rules, 
coupled with a lack of political will, militated against 
reforms and undercut visa liberalisation’s power as 
a foreign policy tool. The lesson from these two case 
studies is that in order for visa-free travel to work as an 
effective foreign policy tool, incentives and compensa-
tions should be well-calculated and devised according 
to the needs of individual countries.
The Western Balkans
The European Commission made it clear early on that 
a tailor-made approach would be adopted to evaluate 
each Western Balkan country on its own merit, based 
on progress in carrying out major reforms. Following 
the launch of a visa dialogue with theWestern Bal-
kans, the Commission devised ‘visa roadmaps’ specific 
to each country. Visa roadmaps comprised two parts: 
requirements relating to the effective implementation 
of visa facilitation and readmission agreements; and re-
quirements regarding document security, illegal migra-
tion, public order and security and external relations.
Progress in meeting the benchmarks of the visa road-
maps was closely monitored by the Commission and 
reported to the Council. Several key issues were taken 
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into account: the European perspective of the Western 
Balkan countries, the political commitment towards 
visa facilitation, the conclusion of readmission agree-
ments by all Western Balkan states, and visa exemptions 
for EU nationals granted by Western Balkan states. The 
EU insisted on a refusal rate of up to 1,000 persons per 
year for the nationals of each Western Balkan country 
–despite dramatic differences in population size.
On the progress scoreboards, Macedonia was always 
a front-runner scoring high on meeting benchmarks, 
followed closely by Montenegro and Serbia, with Alba-
nia and Bosnia lagging behind. After many rounds of 
meetings, report-sharing and national expert missions, 
in July 2009, the Commission proposed visa free travel 
to Macedonia as well asMontenegro and Serbia in July 
2009 on the condition that the latter meet a number of
remaining benchmarks before the Council took the fi-
nal vote. They had to report back by September 2009. 
Consequently, on 30 November 2009 the decision to 
lift visas for Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia citizens 
was approved. The two countries were told their citi-
zens could travel visa-free to EU member states for the
upcoming Christmas.
In July 2009, Albania and Bosnia were asked to fulfil 
specific requirements (53 in Albania’s case and 48 in 
Bosnia’s) and report on their progress by October 2009. 
The European Parliament lobbied hard in favour of visa 
liberalisation for Bosnia and Albania, MEPs arguing that 
this would increase confidence among Bosnian and Al-
banian nationals and help to speed up the pace of re-
forms on the road to EU membership. Upon fulfilment 
of the requirements relating to irregular migration and 
document security, member states agreed to abolish 
the visa requirement. In November 2010, a decision was 
taken to lift visas from mid-December 2010 for Bosnian 
and Albanian holders of biometric passports for short-
term stays of up to 90 days, allowing visa-free entry to 
the Schengen Area.
The political resistance shown by France, Germany and 
the Netherlands towards lifting visas for Albania and 
Bosnia stemmed from their fear of a dramatic increase 
in asylum applications. Commissioner Cecilia Malm-
ström aimed to soothe those fears by highlighting that 
a post-visa monitoring process had been set up, along 
with information campaigns trying to explain the real
meaning of short-term visa-free travel. In fact, although 
Eurostat statistics reveal a sharp increase in the num-
ber of asylum applicants especially from Serbia and 
Macedonia, the post-visa liberalisation mechanism for 
theWestern Balkans seems to be functioning well and 
the re-introduction of visas does not appear to be on 
the horizon. 
Kosovo was the only Western Balkan country left out of 
the visa liberalisation talks. Its nationals still need visas 
to travel to the Schengen Area. Diver gences between 
member states regarding recognition of Kosovo’s inde-
pendence played a significant role in excluding Kosovo 
from the visa-free zone.
The abolition of visa requirements for five of the West-
ern Balkan states put an end to long queues and tore 
down the walls that were dividing families and friends. 
Furthermore, the prospect of visa liberalisation prompt-
ed major justice and home affairs reforms in the region. 
Alongside the improvements regarding document se-
curity, many concrete steps were taken such as the im-
plementation of the legal framework and of the Action 
Plan on the fight against organised crime as well as traf-
ficking in human beings and drugs. The administrative
and investigative capacities of law enforcement author-
ities were strengthened. The implementation of the ac-
tion plan against corruption progressed and monitor-
ing and inter-institutional cooperation have intensified.
Consequently, the strategy has been largely success-
ful in the Western Balkans, yielding the desired results 
and clearly manifesting the strength of the EU’s policy 
of conditionality engrained in the readmission/visa fa-
cilitation package. 
Turkey
Content with the success of the visa facilitationreadmis-
sion package, the Commission has pursued the same 
approach towards Turkey. However, in this case its influ-
ence has been significantly weaker.
EU-Turkey readmission agreement negotiations started 
in 2003, but were suspended for a long time due to the 
lack of compromise from both sides on major issues. 
The negotiations were resumed in 2009 governed by 
the principle of ‘fair burden-sharing’. Convincing Turkey 
to sign an EU readmission agreement is critical as Turkey 
is a major transit route for irregular migrants entering 
the Union. Therefore, getting Ankara to cooperate and 
readmit all the irregular migrants who have entered the 
EU throughTurkey would provide a significant boost to
the EU’s fight against irregular migration.
The readmission negotiations were long and held be-
hind closed doors. Some member states, most notably 
Greece, had last-minute reservations demanding an ex-
plicit reference to the definition of the ‘border region’ 
with Turkey. The hurdles were overcome and following 
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agreement between the European Commission and 
Turkey, the EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement text was 
approved by the Justice and Home Affairs Ministers on 
24 February 2011. In the Council Conclusions of that 
meeting, there is a call for reinforced cooperation be-
tween Turkey and the EU to tackle irregular migration, 
particularly strengthening border controls, fighting traf-
ficking in human beings, increasing reception capacity 
and enhancing institution and capacity building as well 
as finalising the negotiations of the working arrange-
ments betweenTurkey and Frontex.
Turkey had expected an agreement on visa liberalisa-
tion to be authorised simultaneously, as quid pro quo. 
This did not happen. Commissioner Cecilia Malm-
ström’s talk of starting a ‘dialogue on visa, mobility and 
migration’ was perceived as vague and not welcomed 
in Ankara. The last minute insertion of a new paragraph, 
which explicitly stated that this dialogue does not con-
stitute a negotiating mandate, confirmed those fears. 
As a result,Turkey is now not prepared to sign and im-
plement the readmission agreement and will block 
the approval process unless there are some significant 
moves by the Council on visa liberalisation.
This should not have come as a surprise, since Chief 
Negotiator Egemen Bagis had emphasised in many in-
stances that it is clearly ‘nonsense’ and ‘ridiculous’ that 
‘remote countries’ such as Belize, Paraguay and Uru-
guay enjoy visa-free travel and negotiations are ongo-
ing withMoldova, Russia andUkraine, but not Turkey. 
Addressing European diplomats in Brussels he was 
quoted as saying, ‘When our citizens are insulted on 
a daily basis in the consulates of EU states [when they 
apply for visas], one may ask the question as to why 
we should help the EUwith their problems when we 
are treated this way.’ Furthermore, Turkish Foreign Min-
ister Ahmet Davutoglu had called on the EU to take 
the necessary steps to start visa liberalisation talks at 
once.
Ankara argues that Turkish citizens have rights stem-
ming from the Association Agreement and its Addi-
tional Protocol in force since 1973. Those rights have 
been acknowledged by the European Court of Justice 
in numerous instances and recently with the mile-
stone ‘Soysal’ case of February 2009. The Luxembourg 
Court confirmed the illegality of the visa requirement 
forTurkish citizens, who travel to the Schengen Area 
for the purpose of service provision for a period of up 
to three months. The continuation of the visa applica-
tion requirement is perceived as a breach of the EU 
acquis. Put simply, visa facilitation does not amount 
to an additional benefit but rather a step backwards 
given the rights Turkish citizens already possess but 
are unable to
enjoy due to member states’ political resistance. 
Despite inadequate financial assistance from the EU, 
Turkey is working hard to carry out reforms in the area 
of justice and home affairs. These are a prerequisite for 
visa dialogue and are also needed for the opening of 
the chapter on Justice, Freedom and Security in acces-
sion negotiations. ButTurkey’s reform process is stall-
ing, in part because of the weakness of external incen-
tives. The current stalemate in the accession process 
and the blockage on 18 negotiating chapters out of 
35 prevents the resolution of these problems. Despite 
the prevailing negative atmosphere, significant steps 
have been undertaken to establish a working read-
mission system and an asylum mechanism. Key pieces 
of legislation concerning Aliens Law and trafficking 
in human beings are being revised. Perhaps the most 
visible of the reforms is the introduction of biometric 
passports as of 1 June 2010. Also, major efforts have 
been made in the
area of integrated border management.
However, the absence of clear and concise guidelines 
and lack of a visa roadmap hampers EU influence dra-
matically. The reforms that are underway are taking 
longer to be implemented than planned. In relation 
to critical reforms demanded by the EU such as lifting 
the geographical limitation on the Geneva Conven-
tion, Turkey is clearly reluctant to take further steps. 
Also, Turkey has signed bilateral visa agreements with 
Syria, Libya, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia, which 
rank high on the EU’s blacklist and are subject to strict 
visa regulations. Turkey is drifting away from a com-
mon EU visa policy. In line with the slowing down of 
its accession process, Turkey is taking pragmatic steps 
to compensate for the lack of progress in its relations 
with the EU and the failure of the Union to initiate visa 
liberalisation.
At a time when the accession process has come to a vir-
tual halt, Turkey’s motivation to pursue reforms is limited. 
To be able to ‘sell’ the readmission agreement to Turkey, 
the EU has to offer a set of well-defined rules leading to 
visa liberalisation. A vague mention of a visa dialogue 
does not suffice as an incentive to prompt Turkish poli-
ticians and officials to carry out costly reforms. Further-
more, Turkey fears that even if all the reforms are accom-
plished and the technical criteria are met, the right to 
visa-free travel might still not be granted due to the lack 
of political will of some member states.
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Conclusion
The use of visa-free travel as a tool for promoting neces-
sary reforms is not a guaranteed formula which works in 
all cases. The underlying reason can be found in coun-
tries’ cost-benefit calculations, which vary considerably. 
It is widely recognised that readmission agreements 
work to the EU’s interest, while third countries have to 
assume the financial, administrative and social costs. In 
the Western Balkans, the overall goal of drawing closer
to the EU was a strong incentive and a driving force be-
hind the rigorous reform process.
However, in the Turkish case, the political and econom-
ic cost of the readmission agreement in the absence of 
a visa-free regime is extremely high. On one hand, as a 
candidate country engaged in accession negotiations 
since 2005, Turkey has to assume all obligations arising 
from the EU acquis. On the other hand, it can be argued 
that Turkey is in a position to offer ‘reverse conditional-
ity’ and will not sign the readmission agreement unless
the EU commits itself to visa liberalisation. This is made 
possible by Turkey’s strategic location and the credibil-
ity it has gained in the field of bilateral police coopera-
tion and border controls. Given the refugee flows into 
the EU triggered by the recent uprisings in North Africa 
and Middle East, the EU should be mindful of not al-
ienating Turkey as a major transit route and buffer zone 
between Europe and the other regions.
In order for visa-free travel to succeed as a foreign policy 
tool, the EU must lay down clear rules of the game from 
the start of the process. These must be backed by politi-
cal will on both sides. Progress recorded in reforms and 
their sound implementation should move the country 
in question closer to achieving the ultimate goal of vi-
sa-free travel. Constant monitoring of the process and 
a ‘strict but fair’ approach not only helps the EU to use 
the leverage at its disposal but also boosts its image. In 
contrast, a malfunctioning system not only erodes the 
EU’s credibility and conditionality, but also weakens its 
soft power and normative bargaining power.
